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 INTRODUCTION 
These cases do not concern speech or content. Rather, they seek to hold Facebook—a 
major U.S. company—responsible for knowingly providing valuable and substantial aid, support, 
and resources to terrorists in violation of U.S. law. 
Force v. Facebook seeks damages from Facebook on behalf of five American victims of 
terrorism and their families pursuant to the U.S. Antiterrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (“ATA”), 
for aiding and abetting, conspiracy, and providing material support and resources to Hamas, a 
designated foreign terrorist organization that carried out attacks killing or injuring these victims. 
Facebook argues Force should be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, failure to 
state a claim under the ATA, and immunity under the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 
U.S.C. § 230 (“CDA”). But the ATA authorizes personal jurisdiction nationwide, plaintiffs have 
sufficiently stated claims under the ATA, and the CDA does not afford immunity for aiding and 
abetting, conspiring, or providing material support or resources to designated foreign terrorist 
organizations. The CDA also does not supersede or preempt the ATA, which was enacted and 
amended after the CDA, nor does the CDA apply outside the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S. 
Cohen v. Facebook seeks an order enjoining Facebook from providing services to 
terrorists, who use those services to promote and carry out terrorist activities directed at Jews and 
Israelis in Israel. The plaintiffs are 20,000 Israelis living in Israel, in the crosshairs of Hamas. 
Facebook contends Cohen should also be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction and 
CDA immunity, and for lack of standing. But Facebook is also subject to personal jurisdiction by 
consent via its New York business registration, and Facebook’s New York activities support 
specific jurisdiction. Finally, the Cohen plaintiffs have standing because Facebook’s actions 
cause them ongoing injury that can be redressed by the Court granting the relief sought. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Force v. Facebook (The ATA Lawsuit): Procedural Background 
Force was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York 
(“SDNY”) on July 10, 2016, on behalf of five American terror victims and their families. (DE 1). 
Facebook’s counsel executed a Waiver of Service on July 20, 2016. (DE 7). On September 16, 
2016, Facebook filed a “Joint Motion to Transfer” the case to this District, asserting that 28 
U.S.C. § 1404(a) affords courts discretion to transfer a case “to any district or division to which 
all the parties have consented.” (DE 16). The court entered a Consent Order transferring the case 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to this District, “where it might have been brought . . .” (DE 16). 
On September 28, 2016, Congress overrode a presidential veto and enacted the Justice 
Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (“JASTA”), Pub. L. No. 114-222 (2016), which among other 
things, amended the ATA to add new subsection 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d) recognizing substantive 
causes of action for aiding and abetting and conspiracy liability for victims of international 
terrorism. JASTA § 4. Accordingly, on October 10, 2016, the Force plaintiffs filed an Amended 
Complaint (“Force-FAC”), stating claims against Facebook for: ATA liability for aiding and 
abetting (Count I) and conspiracy (Count II); ATA liability for providing material support and 
resources to Hamas in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A (Count III) and 2339B (Count IV); and 
three pendant claims for liability pursuant to the Israeli laws of negligence (Count V), breach of 
statutory duty (Count VI), and vicarious liability (Count VII). (DE 28). 
B. Cohen v. Facebook (The Injunction Lawsuit): Procedural Background 
The Cohen lawsuit was originally filed as Lakin v. Facebook on October 26, 2015 in New 
York state court on behalf of 20,000 Israelis, seeking an injunction requiring Facebook to cease 
providing services to terrorists. (DE 1-1). It was filed during an intense wave of stabbing and 
other terror attacks in Israel that became known as the “Facebook Intifada” because many attacks 
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were directed by terrorists using social media, particularly Facebook. The original lead plaintiff, 
Richard Lakin, was critically injured on October 13, 2015 by two Hamas terrorists who shot and 
stabbed passengers on a bus in Jerusalem, murdering two men and injuring more than a dozen 
others. Sadly, Mr. Lakin died from his wounds sustained in the attack on October 27, 2015. 
Facebook moved to dismiss the state case, plaintiffs filed a response brief with an 
attached Amended Complaint, and Facebook filed its reply. However, the case was stayed by 
operation of law due to the death of Mr. Lakin until a fiduciary could be appointed for his estate. 
Thereafter, Mr. Lakin’s estate and family discontinued their claims in state court without 
prejudice, and refiled in federal court as part of Force. The state court case was re-styled Cohen 
v. Facebook. Facebook then removed the case to this Court. (DE 1). 
The Cohen Amended Complaint (“Cohen-FAC”) is based upon claims under Israeli law 
for negligence (Count I), breach of statutory duty (Count II), and vicarious liability (Count III), 
as well as claims for prima facie tort (Count IV), intentional infliction of emotional distress 
(Count V), aiding and abetting (Count VI), conspiracy (Count VII), and declaratory judgment 
(Count VIII). (DE 1-3, Exhibit A). 
C. Factual Background 
One of the 10 largest U.S. companies, Facebook, traded on the NASDAQ, has a market 
capitalization of more than $344 billion. Facebook is organized under the laws of Delaware and 
headquartered in California, but it maintains substantial offices in many places, including New 
York and Israel. It conducts business and provides products and services throughout the world. 
Facebook’s primary business is providing a sophisticated yet easy-to-use internet social 
media platform and related products and services (collectively, “Services”) under the general 
trade name “Facebook.” Facebook’s Services include use of Facebook’s computer infrastructure, 
network, applications, tools and features, communications services, and more. In the Overview 
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of its business in its 2013 Annual Report filed with the SEC, Facebook described its business as: 
“We build technology to enable faster, easier and richer communication.” In that same report, 
Facebook explained that the success of its business and advertising rates are dependent upon the 
measure of daily and monthly “active users” of Facebook, and that failure to maintain or increase 
its user base and user engagement could have a material adverse impact on its business. Thus, 
Facebook has a strong business incentive not to close active user accounts. 
In order to create a Facebook page and use its services, a user must register with 
Facebook and provide identifying information. Besides the information provided upon 
registration, Facebook by design employs sophisticated data collection and analysis tools to 
gather specific information about each user, including every detail that can be gleaned from the 
user’s computer, smartphone, or other internet use. Facebook uses this data not only to sell 
targeted advertising, but also to actively suggest and introduce users to other users, groups, 
events, notices, posts, articles, videos, and more, that share commonalities with or may be of 
interest to such users. 
This feature of Facebook is extremely valuable, for example, to a retailer or organization 
with a Facebook page that wants to attract customers or supports to its Facebook page (and thus 
to its product or cause). This service is likewise extremely valuable to a terrorist group or 
individual with a Facebook page who wants to attract followers and recruits, since Facebook will 
actively suggest to users with appropriate interests that they visit the terrorist’s Facebook page. 
Of course, networking and “brokering” connections between terrorists and followers is 
only one of many valuable services that Facebook accounts afford terrorists. Facebook’s 
sophisticated platform and services are used by terrorists for communication, logistics, 
intelligence, public relations, fundraising, and even prestige. Terrorists also use Facebook’s 
services to criminally incite, recruit, and carry out terror attacks against Jews in Israel. 
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D. Facebook Knowingly Provides Services to Hamas, a Designated Foreign 
Terrorist Organization 
The “Islamic Resistance Movement” popularly known by its Arabic acronym “Hamas,” 
is among the most widely recognized terrorist organizations in the world. Steeped in anti-
Semitism and ideological opposition to any peaceful solution or compromise with Israel, from its 
inception Hamas has publicly proclaimed that it is committed to the destruction of the State of 
Israel, the establishment of an Islamic state in all of historic Palestine, and the elimination of 
Jews from the land. Hamas proudly and openly acknowledges that it uses terrorism and violence 
to achieve its political goals, claiming that its activities are a legitimate form of “resistance.” 
Since 1989, Hamas has been an officially designated terrorist organization and “unlawful 
organization” under Israeli law. Israeli law prohibits providing material support for terrorism and 
providing any service for any unlawful organization, including terrorist organizations. 
Hamas first gained worldwide notoriety in the 1990’s when it began dispatching suicide 
bombers who carried out bombings on packed buses and at crowded bus stops, restaurants, 
malls, hotels, and hospitals. Hamas has carried out scores of suicide bombings and other terror 
attacks against Israel, murdering more than 1,000 civilians and injuring many thousands more. 
Hamas later expanded its terrorist capabilities by developing and launching missiles into 
Israel from Gaza, targeting Israeli civilian population centers. Between April 2001 and April 
2012, Hamas fired more than 12,700 missiles and mortars into Israel—an average of three 
attacks every single day for 11 years. In the period from 2006-2011, Hamas’s deadly missiles 
and mortars murdered at least 44 Israelis and injured over 1,600 others. This was in addition to 
other terrorist acts that Hamas continued to commit against Jews and Israelis in Israel. 
In 1995, President Clinton issued Executive Order No. 12947 pursuant to the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq. (“IEEPA”), 
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designating Hamas and others as terrorist organizations, and banning the provision of any funds, 
goods, or services to, or for the benefit of specially designated terrorists (“SDT”). Violation of 
these prohibitions is a federal criminal offense. See 31 C.F.R. § 595.204; 50 U.S.C. § 1705. 
In 1997, Hamas was officially designated a “foreign terrorist organization” (“FTO”) 
pursuant to § 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1189. Providing material 
support or resources to an FTO is a federal criminal offense under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. 
In 2001, Hamas was further designated a “specially designated global terrorist” 
(“SDGT”) under Executive Order No. 13224. Federal law prohibits “making of any contribution 
or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any [SDGT],” and violation 
of these prohibitions is a federal criminal offense. See 31 C.F.R. § 594.204; 50 U.S.C. § 1705. 
Facebook has received repeated complaints and warnings that providing services to 
Hamas and other FTO’s violates 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. For example, in September 2013, the Israeli 
Human Rights Law organization Shurat HaDin-Israel Law Center wrote a letter to Facebook’s 
CEO and General Counsel warning that providing assistance or support to designated terrorists is 
unlawful. The letter specifically included Hamas among a list of FTO’s. However, Facebook 
refused to cease providing Facebook services to Hamas and other designated terrorists. 
ARGUMENT 
PART I 
FORCE V. FACEBOOK: THE ATA LAWSUIT 
Facebook attacks the Force lawsuit on the basis of three alleged defects: 1) Facebook 
claims it is not subject to personal jurisdiction in this Court; 2) Facebook asserts that plaintiffs 
have failed to state a claim under the ATA; and 3) Facebook argues that it is entitled to immunity 
by virtue of the CDA. Facebook’s arguments fail because the ATA provides for jurisdiction over 
Facebook via its nationwide service of process statute, the plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts 
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to state their ATA claims against Facebook, and the CDA does not afford immunity to Facebook 
for providing support to Hamas in violation of the ATA and federal criminal law. Moreover, the 
CDA does not apply outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. 
A. Personal Jurisdiction Over Facebook Is Proper Under the ATA 
Plaintiffs need only make a prima facie showing to defeat a motion to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction. See Dorchester Fin. Secs., Inc. v. Banco BRJ, S.A., 722 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 
2013). This requirement is met when plaintiffs demonstrate: “(1) proper service of process upon 
the defendant; (2) a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction over the defendant; and (3) that [the 
court’s] exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant is in accordance with constitutional due 
process principles.” Stroud v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 3d 381, 385 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) 
(citing Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 59-60 (2d Cir. 2012)). In Force, 
each of these elements is met, and personal jurisdiction over Facebook exists, because: Facebook 
waived service of process; the ATA provides a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction on a 
nationwide basis; and exercising personal jurisdiction over Facebook in New York pursuant to 
the ATA does not offend Fifth Amendment due process principles. 
1. Personal Jurisdiction Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(C) and the ATA 
Rule 4(k)(1)(C) states that “[s]erving a summons or filing a waiver of service establishes 
personal jurisdiction over a defendant . . . when authorized by a federal statute.” Thus, “[u]nder 
Rule 4(k)(1)(C), personal jurisdiction may be established through proper service of process upon 
a defendant pursuant to a federal statute that contains its own service provision.” Weiss v. Nat’l 
Westminster Bank PLC, 176 F. Supp. 3d 264, 283 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (citing 4B Wright & Miller et 
al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 1125 (4th ed.)). The ATA contains its own statutory service 
provision, which expressly authorizes nationwide service of process: 
Any civil action under section 2333 of this title against any person may be 
Case 1:16-cv-04453-NGG-LB   Document 29   Filed 01/13/17   Page 15 of 49 PageID #: 980
-8-  
instituted in the district court of the United States for any district where any 
plaintiff resides or where any defendant resides or is served, or has an agent. 
Process in such a civil action may be served in any district where the defendant 
resides, is found, or has an agent. 
18 U.S.C. § 2334(a). Accordingly, the ATA “establish[es] personal jurisdiction over a defendant 
properly served under the statute.” Weiss, 176 F. Supp. 3d at 284 and n.9 (citing Licci, 673 F.3d 
at 59 n.8 (acknowledging the ATA’s nationwide service of process provision as a possible basis 
for personal jurisdiction); Stansell v. BGP, Inc., 2011 WL 1296881, at *3 (M.D. Fla. 2011); 
Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org., 2011 WL 1345086, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Wultz v. 
Islamic Rep. of Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 31-32 (D.D.C. 2010); In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 
2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 806-07 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Hermann, 9 
F.3d 1049, 1056 (2d Cir. 1993) (federal statute authorizing nationwide service of process may be 
used to establish personal jurisdiction)). 
Force was originally filed in the SDNY. Facebook is licensed to do business in the State 
of New York (Force-FAC, ¶ 22), has a New York headquarters with more than 350,000 square 
feet of custom-designed office space and more than 1,300 employees at 770 Broadway in 
Manhattan (MTD, So Decl. ¶ 5), which is in the SDNY. Facebook’s New York counsel executed 
a waiver of service (DE 7), which was filed in that court. Facebook subsequently filed a “Joint 
Motion to Transfer” the Force lawsuit to this District. 
Facebook’s being licensed to do business in New York, plus its significant business 
presence in New York, demonstrate that Facebook is “found” and “has an agent” in the SDNY. 
Accordingly, personal jurisdiction was properly established over Facebook in the SDNY, where 
the case was initiated, pursuant to the ATA’s nationwide service of process statute.1 
                                                 
1 Facebook did not challenge venue in the SDNY, nor does it challenge venue in this 
District. Indeed, Facebook consented to venue in this District when it filed a Joint Motion to 
(continued next page) 
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2. Personal Jurisdiction Over Facebook Satisfies Fifth Amendment Due Process 
The next inquiry is whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Facebook satisfies 
constitutional due process. Because Force is based upon the ATA, a federal statute that provides 
exclusive federal jurisdiction and nationwide service of process, the proper inquiry is whether 
Facebook has sufficient minimum contacts with the United States as a whole. Weiss, 176 F. 
Supp. 3d at 285 (citing In re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., 2015 WL 4634541, 
at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2015); Wultz v. Rep. of Iran, 762 F. Supp. 2d 18, 25 (D.D.C. 2011); In 
re Terrorist Attacks, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 806 (holding where jurisdiction asserted under ATA 
service provision, “relevant inquiry…is whether the defendant has minimum contacts with the 
United States as a whole [to satisfy Fifth Amendment due process requirements], rather than . . . 
with the particular state in which the federal court sits.”) (quoting Estate of Ungar ex rel. 
Strachman v. Palestinian Auth., 153 F. Supp. 2d 76, 87 (D.R.I. 2001)) (alterations in original)).2 
Facebook obviously has “minimum contacts” with the United States, and it cannot 
possibly meet its burden to make a “compelling case that the presence of some other 
considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable” in this case. Bank Brussels Lambert v. 
Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez, 305 F.3d 120, 129 (2d Cir. 2002). 
Therefore, Facebook’s challenge to personal jurisdiction in the ATA case fails.3 
B. The Force Plaintiffs Have Stated ATA Claims Against Facebook 
On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must accept all allegations of fact in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Transfer the Force case to this District. (DE 16). Facebook’s current motion to dismiss challenges 
personal jurisdiction in New York, not specifically in the EDNY. Since personal jurisdiction 
existed in the SDNY, jurisdiction remains even though the case was transferred to the EDNY on 
consent of all parties for consolidation with a related case. 
2 See Gucci America, Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122, 142 n.21 (2d Cir. 2014) (noting several 
circuits have endorsed analyzing “contacts with the United States as a whole” for personal 
jurisdiction in cases arising under federal statutes that authorize nationwide service). 
3 Personal jurisdiction is also proper in Force as discussed in Part II, Section A below. 
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complaint as true, and draw all reasonable inferences from the allegations in favor of the 
plaintiff. ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007). A motion to 
dismiss must be denied if the complaint alleges “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 
Facebook argues that the Force lawsuit fails to state a claim under the ATA on three 
grounds: 1) that the plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that Facebook violated 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2339A or 2339B, or committed an act of “international terrorism”; 2) that the plaintiffs were 
not injured “by reason of” Facebook’s activities; and 3) that the plaintiffs have not plausibly 
alleged ATA claims for aiding and abetting and conspiracy liability. These contentions fail. 
1. Facebook’s Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A and § 2339B Constituted 
“International Terrorism” Under 18 U.S.C. § 2331 
Facebook argues that the “direct liability” ATA claims (Counts III and IV) do not 
plausibly allege that Facebook violated §§ 2339A or 2339B, or committed an act of 
“international terrorism.” Facebook claims that: 1) plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that 
Facebook had the requisite “knowledge” to violate §§ 2339A or 2339B; and 2) even if Facebook 
violated §§ 2339A or 2339B, these violations do not constitute an act of “international 
terrorism.” (MTD at 38-40). Facebook’s arguments fail because the detailed allegations in the 
Force-FAC more than suffice to create a reasonable inference that Facebook satisfied the 
scienter component of both material support statutes, and courts have held that violations of 
§§ 2339A and 2339B constitute “international terrorism” under 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1). 
a) Facebook Violated §§ 2339A and 2339B 
Title 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A imposes criminal penalties upon: 
[w]ho[m]ever provides material support or resources … knowing or intending that 
they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation of [federal 
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terrorism crimes], or in preparation for, or in carrying out, the concealment of an 
escape from commission of any such violation, or attempts or conspires to do so. 
18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a). 
Title 18 U.S.C. § 2339B imposes criminal penalties upon “[w]ho[m]ever knowingly 
provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires 
to do so.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1). Subsection 2339B(g)(6) defines “terrorist organization” as 
“an organization designated as a terrorist organization under Section 219 of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act” (i.e., a designated “FTO”). Subsection 2339B(a)(1) provides that a person 
violates § 2339B if he has knowledge either that the beneficiary organization: 1) is a designated 
FTO; 2) has engaged or engages in “terrorist activity” (as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)); 
or 3) has engaged or engages in “terrorism” (as defined by § 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989). 
“Material support or resources” is defined for both § 2339A and § 2339B as follows:  
(1) the term “material support or resources” means any property, tangible or 
intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial 
securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, 
safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, 
facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals 
who may be or include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious 
materials. 
18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b); 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(g)(4). 
Significantly, Facebook does not challenge the sufficiency of plaintiffs’ allegations that 
Facebook provided its social media platform and related products and services to Hamas, its 
leaders, and affiliates. Indeed, the Force-FAC is replete with examples of Facebook accounts 
maintained and used by these organizations and individuals (e.g., ¶¶ 118-125). 
Facebook also does not challenge the sufficiency of plaintiffs’ allegations that the 
resources and services it provided Hamas, its leaders, and affiliates constitute “material support 
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or resources” as defined by §§ 2339A and 2339B. The Force-FAC details many of these 
resources, which include use of Facebook’s computer infrastructure, network, applications, tools, 
communications services, payment mechanisms, plugins for external websites, algorithms, and 
more (e.g., ¶¶ 91-99, 519-542). Plaintiffs also give many examples of how Hamas uses and 
benefits from Facebook to promote and carry out its activities (e.g., ¶¶ 100-115, 126-155). 
Facebook does not challenge the sufficiency of plaintiffs’ § 2339A allegations that the 
material support and resources it provided to Hamas, its leaders, and affiliates were “used in 
preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation of [federal crimes of terrorism]….” Plaintiffs 
provided many examples of such use in the Force-FAC. (¶¶ 126-155, and Part III thereof). 
Moreover, the sophisticated platform and services that Facebook provides to Hamas are 
very valuable, yet they are provided to Hamas for free. This is an enormous benefit and support 
to Hamas, because it enables Hamas to direct funds that it would have had to spend for 
communications, software, networking, and other services, toward terrorist operations. See 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 30 (2010) (“‘Material support’ is a valuable 
resource by definition. Such support frees up other resources within the organization that may be 
put to violent ends. It also importantly helps lend legitimacy to foreign terrorist groups—
legitimacy that makes it easier for those groups to persist, to recruit members, and to raise 
funds—all of which facilitate more terrorist attacks.”). 
As to § 2339B, Facebook does not challenge the sufficiency of plaintiffs’ allegations that 
Hamas is a designated FTO, that Facebook knew Hamas is a designated FTO, and that Facebook 
knew Hamas had engaged and engages in terrorist activity within the meaning of § 2339B. The 
Force-FAC indeed provides factual support from which each of these elements may be 
reasonably inferred (e.g., ¶¶ 68-90, 500-505). 
Facebook’s sole challenge as to §§ 2339A and 2339B concerns the sufficiency of 
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plaintiffs’ allegations “to show knowing provision of support.” (MTD at 39) (emphasis in 
original). However, Facebook’s challenge is without merit. 
In Ahmad v. Christian Friends of Israeli Communities, 2014 WL 1796322 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014), a case alleging violation of §§ 2339A and 2339C (financing terrorism), the Court 
explained the scienter requirement as follows: 
In order to trigger liability under [§§ 2339A and 2339C of] the ATA, the recipient 
of a defendant’s support need not be a designated foreign terrorist organization … 
But there must be some evidence — for instance, that the recipients of the aid 
have publicly stated terrorist goals or are associates of established terrorist 
organizations—from which a finder of fact could conclude that the defendant 
either knew, or was deliberately indifferent to the possibility, that it was 
supporting international terrorism. 
Id. at *3 (citing Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 925 F. Supp. 2d 414, 426, 428 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(holding that civil liability under the ATA requires a defendant to at least “kn[o]w there was a 
substantial probability that [it] was supporting terrorists”)). 
Unlike § 2339A, violation of § 2339B does require that the beneficiary of a defendant’s 
material support or resources actually be a designated FTO (and there is no dispute Hamas is a 
designated FTO). Yet § 2339B likewise does not require specific intent to support terrorism. As 
the Second Circuit recently held: 
For the purposes of § 2339B(a)(1), a defendant has knowledge that an 
organization engages in terrorist activity if the defendant has actual knowledge of 
such activity or if the defendant exhibited deliberate indifference to whether the 
organization engages in such activity. See Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 925 F. 
Supp. 2d 414, 428-29 (E.D.N.Y.2013); In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 
2001, 740 F. Supp. 2d 494, 517 (S.D.N.Y.2010). A defendant exhibits deliberate 
indifference if it “knows there is a substantial probability that the organization 
engages in terrorism but ... does not care.” Boim, 549 F.3d at 693. 
Weiss v. Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC, 768 F.3d 202, 208 (2d Cir. 2014). See Goldberg v. UBS 
Ag, 660 F.Supp.2d 410, 428 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)(“plaintiffs have sufficiently pled that the defendant 
consciously disregarded the fact that it was supporting a terrorist organization, despite a strong 
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probability that [its] services would be used to further the organization’s terrorist activities”). 
Courts apply a lenient standard for evaluating allegations of scienter, since proof of 
knowledge often depends upon inferences drawn from the evidence. See Weiss, 768 F.3d at  211 
(2d Cir. 2014) (applying “lenient” standard for sufficiency of evidence of scienter for § 2339B 
on summary judgment); In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 585 F.3d 677, 693 (2d 
Cir. 2009) (“We are ... ‘lenient in allowing scienter issues to withstand summary judgment based 
on fairly tenuous inferences,’ because such issues are ‘appropriate for resolution by the trier of 
fact.’ … The same holds true for allowing such issues to survive motions to dismiss.”). 
The Force-FAC contains many factual allegations plausibly demonstrating Facebook’s 
knowledge, or at the very least deliberate indifference, to the fact that it provides services to 
Hamas. Plaintiffs alleged that Facebook refused to actively monitor its online social network to 
block Hamas’s use of Facebook, and “[e]ven when Facebook has received complaints about 
Hamas’s use of the platform, Facebook has at various times determined that the Hamas 
Facebook page did not violate Facebook’s policies and permitted the page to remain, or deleted 
only a portion of the content on the Hamas Facebook page and permitted the site to remain 
active.” (¶¶ 547-549). For example, Facebook received multiple complaints about a Hamas video 
calling for and depicting a suicide bombing of a bus full of Jews that appeared on several Hamas 
Facebook accounts, but Facebook replied that the video did not violate Facebook’s “Community 
Standards.” (¶ 512). As another example, in July 2014 Facebook closed Hamas spokesman Izzat 
al-Risheq’s Facebook account, claiming that it does not tolerate terrorism; however, in January 
2015 Facebook removed a single post (praising a Hamas terrorist attack in Tel Aviv) from al-
Risheq’s Facebook page but left the rest of his Facebook page intact. (¶¶ 550-554). Facebook has 
on occasion suspended selected Hamas-related Facebook accounts in response to public or 
government pressure, but later reactivated them, or consciously refrained from making any 
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effective or prolonged effort to ensure that the pages are not reestablished. (¶ 553).  
Plaintiffs also demonstrated that Hamas, its leaders, and affiliates, maintain Facebook 
accounts in their own names that openly display the emblems and symbols of Hamas. (¶¶ 118-
125). Many of these individuals and entities are themselves specially designated global terrorists 
due to their Hamas affiliation. Id. Facebook, via its subsidiary Facebook Payments, Inc., is a 
registered money services business (see https://www.fincen.gov/msb-registrant-search), and as 
such is required to monitor its money service customers to comply with counter-terrorism 
regulations using the U.S. Treasury’s publicly available list of specially designated terrorists and 
terrorist organizations. Facebook could easily have used the same list to ensure that it does not 
provide Facebook accounts to designated terrorists including Hamas. (¶ 505). Prominent 
politicians and government committees have also made public statements that social media 
companies, including Facebook, “need to do more” to deny services to terrorists, and that 
“[s]ocial media companies are consciously failing to combat the use of their sites to promote 
terrorism and killings.” (¶¶ 513-518). Facebook’s business relies on retaining and growing the 
number of active Facebook account users, and therefore Facebook benefits from only deleting 
selected messages and leaving Hamas accounts active. (¶¶ 557-560). The many allegations and 
examples provided in the Force-FAC sufficiently show that Facebook knowingly, or at least with 
deliberate indifference, provided its services to and for the benefit of Hamas and its affiliates. 
b) Violation of §§ 2339A and 2339B Constitutes “International Terrorism” 
Facebook argues that, even if plaintiffs can demonstrate that Facebook violated §§ 2339A 
and 2339B by providing material support and resources to Hamas, plaintiffs’ “direct claims” do 
not sufficiently demonstrate that Facebook committed an act of “international terrorism” within 
the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1). 
Facebook cites no case law in support of this argument, for indeed the consensus is that 
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violations of §§ 2339A and 2339B constitute acts of “international terrorism” as defined under 
the ATA. See Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. & Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 291 F.3d 
1000, 1015 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Because Congress intended to impose criminal liability for funding 
violent terrorism, we find that it also intended through sections 2333 and 2331(1) to impose civil 
liability for funding at least as broad a class of violent terrorist acts. If the plaintiffs could show 
that defendants violated either section 2339A or section 2339B, that conduct would certainly be 
sufficient to meet the definition of ‘international terrorism’ under sections 2333 and 2331); Linde 
v. Arab Bank, 97 F. Supp. 3d 287, 322 (E.D.N.Y., 2015) (“Completing a wire transfer generally 
cannot be described as ‘violent’ or ‘dangerous to human life’ in the colloquial sense. But … 
providing material support to a terrorist organization is an act ‘dangerous to human life.’ … The 
same is true for the requirement that the act ‘appear to be intended’ to intimidate.”); Strauss v. 
Crédit Lyonnais, S.A., 925 F. Supp. 2d 414, 426 (E.D.N.Y., 2013) (“Violations of Sections 
2339B and 2339C are considered to be acts of ‘international terrorism’ under Section 2333(a)”); 
Goldberg v. UBS Ag, 660 F. Supp.2d at 426-27 (same, collecting cases). 
Accordingly, this claim is without merit. 
2. Plaintiffs Were Injured “by reason of” an Act of International Terrorism 
Facebook also contends that the Force plaintiffs’ “direct claims” under the ATA fail to 
sufficiently allege that Facebook’s provision of material support and resources to Hamas was a 
proximate cause of their injuries. Quoting Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 97 (2d Cir. 2013), 
Facebook argues that plaintiffs do not allege that Facebook “‘was a participant in the terrorist 
attacks that injured plaintiffs [or their loved ones]’ or that it funded those attacks.” (MTD at 33). 
But these are clearly not the only allegations that would meet the standard of proximate cause. 
In Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d at 94-96, plaintiffs who were suing for injuries from 
Hamas terror attacks argued that “causation could be presumed” under the ATA based upon the 
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allegation that UBS “committed a per se violation of a statute” prohibiting giving U.S. currency 
to Iran. The Second Circuit rejected this argument, holding that the “by reason of” language in § 
2333(a) demonstrates Congress’s intent that liability under the ATA requires a showing of 
“proximate cause.” Id. Similarly, in O’Neill v. Al Rajhi Bank (In re Terrorist Attacks on Sep. 11, 
2001), 714 F.3d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 2013), the Second Circuit applied Rothstein, and held that 
allegations that defendants gave money to charity organizations known to support terror did not 
sufficiently allege proximate cause, because the plaintiffs did not allege that either the defendants 
or the charities actually gave money to al-Qaeda, the group that carried out the attacks at issue. 
In Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 925 F. Supp. 2d 414, 432 (E.D.N.Y. 2013), the Court 
recognized that “the Second Circuit in Rothstein held that the phrase ‘by reason of’ [in 
§ 2333(a)] requires that Plaintiffs show that their damages were proximately caused by 
Defendant.” The Court stated that “[a]s the term is ‘ordinarily used,’ proximate cause requires a 
showing that Defendant’s actions were ‘a substantial factor in the sequence of responsible 
causation,’ and that the injury was ‘reasonably foreseeable or anticipated as a natural 
consequence.’” Id. (quoting Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., 318 F.3d 113, 123 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
Strauss distinguished Rothstein on the ground that in Rothstein currency was provided to 
Iran, which was not claimed to be the terrorist group that carried out attacks but rather a sponsor 
of a terrorist group, whereas in Strauss the plaintiffs were injured by Hamas and alleged that 
defendants had provided money to Hamas front groups.4 Strauss explained that such differences 
are important “because Congress has specifically found that ‘foreign organizations that engage in 
terrorist activity are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such an 
                                                 
4 Strauss held that providing material support to organizations controlled by Hamas is 
no different than providing material support directly to Hamas for purposes of the ATA. 
Strauss, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 435. 
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organization facilitates that conduct.’” Id. (quoting AEDP, Pub. L. 104–32, § 301(a)(7), 110 Stat. 
1214, 1247 (1996)). For example, even “the social services provided by Hamas and its front 
groups are integral to building popular support for its organization and goals, which then 
facilitates its ability to carry out violent attacks. Id. at 434 (citing Boim, 549 F.3d at 698). 
Accordingly, Strauss held that “plaintiffs who bring an ATA action are not required to trace 
specific dollars to specific attacks to satisfy the proximate cause standard. Such a task would be 
impossible and would make the ATA practically dead letter.” Id.  
More recently, Linde, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 324, addressed proximate cause under the ATA, 
and concluded that “neither [Rothstein nor Al Rajhi] held that but-for causation is a requirement 
of the ATA.” Linde explained that “[p]roximate cause is a legal inquiry—focusing largely on 
foreseeability—that asks whether X and Y are sufficiently connected to justify holding one 
accountable for the other as a matter of legal policy.” Id. Linde rejected a “but-for” causation 
requirement, pointing to “Congress’ intent to impede terrorism by ‘the imposition of liability at 
any point along the causal chain of terrorism,’” plus the fact that such a standard would make it 
impossible for victims of terrorist attacks to hold supporters of terrorist groups liable, and would 
thus “eviscerate the civil liability provisions of the ATA.” Id. at 326. Linde agreed with Strauss 
and found proximate cause to be satisfied if it could be inferred that the defendant’s material 
support “was a substantial reason that Hamas was able to perpetrate the terrorist attacks at issue, 
and that Hamas’ increased ability to carry out deadly attacks was a foreseeable consequence” of 
providing such material support. Id. at 328-29 (quoting Strauss, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 432). 
The Force-FAC alleges detailed facts showing Hamas’s extensive use of Facebook’s 
services and resources since at least 2011 to carry out essential functions of the organization and 
its terrorist activities. These resources strengthen Hamas internally as an organization (for 
example by providing communication, logistics, and networking capabilities, and freeing-up 
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funds for other terrorist activities), as well as externally (for example by enabling Hamas to build 
local public support for its terrorist operations, generate a cult of hatred, violence, and death, and 
recruit more followers to carry out attacks). Plaintiffs provided specific examples of how Hamas, 
its leaders, and affiliates used Facebook leading up to, in the course of, and after each specific 
attack at issue, to bolster their terrorist operations and make such attacks more likely, and more 
effective in intimidating Israelis and encouraging followers to carry out attacks. Plaintiffs have 
thus sufficiently alleged proximate causation, and Facebook’s challenge is without merit. 
3. Facebook Aided, Abetted, and Conspired With Hamas 
With the enactment of JASTA, 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d) now explicitly authorizes substantive 
causes of action for aiding and abetting and conspiracy liability for victims of terrorism: 
In an action under [18 U.S.C. § 2333(a)] for an injury arising from an act of 
international terrorism committed, planned, or authorized by an [FTO] … liability 
may be asserted as to any person who aids and abets, by knowingly providing 
substantial assistance, or who conspires with the person[5] who committed such 
an act of international terrorism. 
18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2). In enacting JASTA, Congress directed that the decision in Halberstam v. 
Welch, 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983) “provides the proper legal framework for how such 
liability should function in the context of chapter 113B of title 18, United States Code.” JASTA 
§ 2(a)(5). An earlier ATA case explained the significance of Halberstam: 
In Halberstam, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, relying heavily on The 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 876 (1979) [“Restatement”], upheld civil aiding 
and abetting liability, and also civil conspiracy liability, against a woman 
[Hamilton] who had knowingly and substantially assisted her co-defendant 
[Welch], a murderer, by performing otherwise legal services, such as acting as 
banker, bookkeeper and secretary, knowing that these activities assisted his illegal 
activities, even though she had no specific knowledge of, or intent to commit, the 
particular illegal activity, i.e., murder, with which she and he were civilly 
                                                 
5 Section 2333(d)(1) provides that, for subsection (d), the term “person” has the meaning 
giving in 1 U.S.C. § 1, where the word “person” is defined to “include corporations, companies, 
associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.” 
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charged. As the court stated, “Although her own acts were neutral standing alone, 
they must be evaluated in the context of the enterprise they aided, i.e., a five-year-
long burglary campaign against private homes.” Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 488. 
The Court noted that “the implications of tort law in this area [civil remedies for 
criminal acts] as a supplement to the criminal justice process and possibly as a 
deterrent to criminal activity cannot be casually dismissed.” Halberstam, 705 F.2d 
at 489. 
Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 583-84 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (emphasis added). 
a) Aiding and Abetting 
Halberstam identified the following elements for an aiding and abetting claim: 
(1) the party whom the defendant aids must perform a wrongful act that causes an 
injury; (2) the defendant must be generally aware of his role as part of an overall 
illegal or tortious activity at the time he provides the assistance; and (3) the 
defendant must knowingly and substantially assist the principal violation. 
Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 477. Applying these elements to the facts in that case, Halberstam 
explained that the first was fulfilled when co-defendant Welch killed the victim (Halberstam) 
during a burglary; the second was fulfilled because defendant Hamilton “had a general 
awareness of her role in a continuing criminal enterprise”; and the knowledge requirement of the 
third was satisfied because the evidence supported the inference that Hamilton assisted Welch 
“with knowledge that [Welch] had engaged in illegal acquisition of goods.” Id. at 488. Regarding 
Hamilton’s knowledge, Halberstam clarified that: 
It was not necessary that Hamilton knew specifically that Welch was committing 
burglaries. Rather, when she assisted him, it was enough that she knew he was 
involved in some type of personal property crime at night—whether as a fence, 
burglar, or armed robber made no difference—because violence and killing is a 
foreseeable risk in any of these enterprises. 
Id. The Court explained that the extent of liability for aiding and abetting is based upon 
foreseeability. Id. at 484. Hamilton was liable for the murder committed by Welch as “a natural 
and foreseeable consequence of the activity Hamilton helped Welch to undertake.” Id. at 488. 
Applying these elements to the Force claims that Facebook aided and abetted Hamas, the 
first element is satisfied, because plaintiffs alleged they were injured by terrorist operations 
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carried out by Hamas, the party to whom plaintiffs allege Facebook provided assistance. The 
second element is satisfied because Facebook at the very least “had a general awareness of its 
role” in Hamas’s terrorist activities through Hamas’s use of Facebook’s platform and services. 
As discussed above, the Force-FAC contains numerous allegations and examples of Hamas, its 
leaders, and affiliates openly maintaining and using Facebook accounts in their own names and 
with the emblems and symbols of Hamas, many over a period of years (e.g., ¶¶ 118-125). 
Plaintiffs have alleged that Facebook has refused to monitor, identify, and shut down Hamas-
affiliated Facebook accounts, and even when Facebook received complaints about such sites, 
“Facebook has at various times determined that the Hamas Facebook page did not violate 
Facebook’s policies and permitted the page to remain, or deleted only a portion of the content on 
the Hamas Facebook page and permitted the site to remain active.” (¶¶ 547-549). In light of 
these allegations, Facebook’s argument that a Facebook spokesman’s statement that “[t]here are 
no pages of Hamas on Facebook” in 2014 “negates any inference that Facebook knew itself to be 
providing services to Hamas” (MTD at 37), is flawed. In fact, given the plaintiffs’ allegations, 
including the continuous criticism Facebook has received for failing to monitor and shut down 
Hamas accounts, the statement actually strengthens the inference that Facebook knew it was 
providing services to Hamas but chose to consciously disregard that fact and claim ignorance. 
See Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 486 (“even [Hamilton’s] protestations at trial that she knew 
absolutely nothing about Welch’s wrongdoing—combine[d with other evidence] to make the 
district court’s inference that she knew he was engaged in illegal activities acceptable, to say the 
least”). Lastly, the knowledge component of the third element of aiding and abetting is satisfied 
because, as discussed above, plaintiffs’ allegations support the inference that Facebook has 
provided its services to Hamas with knowledge that Hamas had engaged in terrorist activity. See 
Id. at 488 (it was enough that Hamilton knew that Welch was involved in some type of crime for 
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which violence and killing is a foreseeable risk). 
The final component of the third element is whether the defendant’s assistance was 
“substantial.” Halberstam explained: “Aiding-abetting focuses on whether a defendant 
knowingly gave ‘substantial assistance’ to someone who performed wrongful conduct, not on 
whether the defendant agreed to join the wrongful conduct.” Id. at 478. The Court noted that 
“many variables enter[] into the equation on how much aid is ‘substantial aid,’” but focused on 
five factors from the Restatement: 1) “the nature of the act encouraged”; 2) “the amount [and 
kind] of assistance given”; 3) “the defendant’s absence or presence at the time of the tort”; 4) 
“his relation to the tortious actor”; and 5) “the defendant’s state of mind.” Id. at 483-84 (addition 
in original). The Court also added a sixth factor: “duration of the assistance provided.” Id. 
Facebook attempts to narrow the scope of this inquiry and minimize the assistance it 
provided by claiming that the “principle violations were the individual attacks” of kidnapping, 
shooting, striking, and stabbing the victims by individual perpetrators. (MTD at 35-36). 
However, this is directly contrary to Halberstam. In assessing the liability of defendant Hamilton 
for a murder committed by her co-defendant Welch during a burglary, the Halberstam court 
stated: “[W]e first look at the nature of the act assisted, here a long-running burglary enterprise… 
Although her own acts were neutral standing alone, they must be evaluated in the context of the 
enterprise she aided, i.e., a five-year-long burglary campaign against private homes.” 705 F.2d at 
488. Likewise, the principle violation in Force is Hamas’s ongoing engagement in international 
terrorism, for which violence and killing is not only a foreseeable risk, but an integral part of 
Hamas’s activities and goals. While Facebook argues that “any assistance provided by Facebook 
is not the type of assistance that ‘might matter’ to the attacks” (MTD at 35), the Force-FAC 
provides many ways in which Hamas uses Facebook to further its terrorist enterprise. 
Examining the “amount [and kind] of assistance given” in Halberstam, the court stated: 
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“although the amount of assistance Hamilton gave Welch may not have been overwhelming as to 
any given burglary in the five-year life of this criminal operation, it added up over time to an 
essential part of the pattern.” 705 F.2d at 488. Similarly in Force, Facebook is alleged to have 
been providing its platform and services to Hamas since at least 2011, all the while turning a 
blind eye to Hamas’s use of Facebook to promote and carry out its terrorist activities, and 
refusing to actively identify and close Hamas-affiliated accounts. 
The third and fourth factors that Halberstam considered, “the defendant’s absence or 
presence at the time of the tort” and “his relation to the tortious actor,” were not deemed 
controlling in Halberstam as it was not significant that the defendant “was admittedly not present 
at the time of the murder or even at the time of any burglary,” and regarding the defendant’s 
relationship to the murderer, the Court stated, “we accord it a low priority in our calculus.” Id. 
These factors should be even less important in Force, since the cases discussed in Halberstam all 
involved individual defendants, whereas Facebook is a corporation. Nevertheless, the Force-
FAC describes Hamas’s integration of Facebook throughout its operations, including 
recruitment, communications, networking, and logistics. Moreover, by turning a blind eye to 
Hamas’s use of its platform, Facebook “enables Hamas terrorists to come out of hiding and 
present a public face under their own brand and logo, and under the brand and logo of an 
American company: Facebook.” (Force-FAC ¶ 116). Thus, “Facebook lends a sense of 
authenticity and legitimacy to Hamas as an organization that can operate openly and with 
impunity, notwithstanding the murderous crimes it commits and its status as an illegal terrorist 
organization.” (¶ 115). 
The final two factors discussed in Halberstam are the defendant’s state of mind and the 
duration of assistance provided. In Force, plaintiffs’ allegations more than suffice to show that 
Facebook knew it was providing services to Hamas but deliberately refused to use its technology 
Case 1:16-cv-04453-NGG-LB   Document 29   Filed 01/13/17   Page 31 of 49 PageID #: 996
-24-  
or resources to actively identify Hamas Facebook accounts and shut them down for years. 
The foregoing analysis of the Force plaintiffs’ allegations in light of Halberstam shows 
the plaintiffs have properly stated a claim of aiding and abetting liability against Facebook under 
the ATA, and Facebook’s motion to dismiss is without merit. 
b) Conspiracy 
Halberstam identified the elements of conspiracy as: 1) “an agreement to do an unlawful 
act or a lawful act in an unlawful manner”; 2) “an overt act in furtherance of the agreement by 
someone participating in it”; and 3) injury caused by the act.” 705 F.2d at 487. The Court 
explained that “[t]he prime distinction between civil conspiracies and aiding-abetting is that a 
civil conspiracy involves an agreement to participate in a wrongful activity.” Id. at 488. The 
rationale is that “[a]n agreement to participate in a wrongful course of action suffices to create 
vicarious liability.” Id. at 479. 
Halberstam stated further: “[C]ourts have to infer an agreement from indirect evidence in 
most civil conspiracy cases. The circumstances of the wrongdoing generally dictate what 
evidence is relevant or available in deciding whether an agreement exists.” Id. at 486. Moreover, 
“[p]roof of a tacit, as opposed to explicit, understanding is sufficient to show agreement.” Id. at 
477 (citing W. Prosser, Law of Torts Sec. 46, at 292 (4th ed. 1971); 16 Am. Jur. 2d Conspiracy 
§ 68 (1979)). Halberstam held that “[t]he long-running nature of the scheme is also crucial to the 
inference of agreement—Hamilton’s knowledge and aid over five years makes some kind of 
accord extremely likely—perhaps only a tacit accord, but that is enough.” 705 F.2d at 487. 
Facebook attempts to skirt responsibility by focusing on an absurdly narrow and incorrect 
reading of plaintiffs’ claims, arguing that plaintiffs “have not plausibly alleged that Facebook 
conspired with the [individual] perpetrators of the attacks.” (MTD at 37). But the Force plaintiffs 
alleged very clearly that “Facebook conspired with Hamas.” (Force-FAC ¶ 573). Plaintiffs 
Case 1:16-cv-04453-NGG-LB   Document 29   Filed 01/13/17   Page 32 of 49 PageID #: 997
-25-  
alleged and provided examples of occasions when “Facebook has suspended selected Hamas-
related Facebook accounts (for example, in response to public or government pressure) but later 
reactivated them, or shut down or blocked a Hamas Facebook account while consciously 
refraining from making any effective or prolonged effort to ensure that the pages are not re-
established using another account identifier.” (¶ 553) 
For example, in July 2014 the press reported that Facebook had removed the Facebook 
account of official Hamas spokesman Izzat al-Risheq, but by January 2015 al-Risheq was again 
openly using Facebook in his own name to promote Hamas terrorism. (¶ 554). When Facebook 
learned that al-Risheq posted a message on January 21, 2015 praising a terrorist attack on a city 
bus in Tel Aviv that wounded 12 Israelis, Facebook removed the message but did not suspend, 
block, or close al-Risheq’s Facebook account. (¶¶ 550-551). Facebook took no action against 
Hamas’s official “Media Office” Facebook page (adorned with the Hamas emblem and using its 
own name), which quoted al-Risheq’s statement verbatim the same day and even attributed the 
statement to al-Risheq in English. (¶¶ 552, 554). This should be no surprise, since Facebook has 
refused to take steps itself to identify Hamas accounts, and even when such accounts are 
reported, Facebook has permitted the pages to remain. (¶¶ 512, 518, 547-49). 
Linde, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 571, applied Halberstam to deny defendant bank’s motion to 
dismiss a claim that the bank had conspired with Hamas and other terrorist groups, concluding: 
[Plaintiffs] adequately alleged that Arab Bank knowingly and intentionally agreed 
to provide services to organizations it knew to be terrorist organizations and that 
they were injured by an overt act which was done in furtherance of the common 
scheme. It is not necessary that they allege that Arab Bank either planned, or 
intended, or even knew about the particular act which injured a plaintiff. 
384 F. Supp. 3d at 584. Linde further explained:  
[m]aterial support given to a terrorist organization can be used to promote the 
organization’s unlawful activities, regardless of donor intent. Once the support is 
given, the donor has no control over how it is used….Moreover, all material 
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support given to such organizations aids their unlawful goals. 
Id. at 586 (quoting Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1134, 1136 (9th Cir. 
2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 904, 121 S. Ct. 1226 (2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Facebook’s knowledge of the terrorist nature of Hamas and its pattern of turning a blind 
eye and knowingly allowing Hamas accounts to remain open and active over the course of years 
provide evidence of Facebook’s tacit agreement to provide services and resources to Hamas—in 
violation of federal law—to promote and carry out its activities. ((¶ 555). Plaintiffs were injured 
by Hamas terror attacks, which were “a reasonably foreseeable consequence” of providing 
material support to a terrorist organization. See Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 487. Accordingly, 
plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient to state a claim for conspiracy under the ATA. 
C. The CDA Does Not Bar the ATA Claims 
Facebook contends that the Force plaintiffs’ claims are barred as a matter of law by the 
CDA. The relevant provision of the CDA states: “No provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another 
information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). 
The language of § 230(c)(1) makes it clear that the CDA only addresses claims that 
depend upon treating Facebook as the “speaker” or “publisher” of another party’s content. See 
Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 17 N.Y.3d 281, 289 (2011) (“section 230 . . . generally 
immuniz[es] Internet service providers from liability for third-party content wherever such 
liability depends on characterizing the provider as a ‘publisher or speaker’ of objectionable 
material”). The CDA does not immunize Facebook’s violation of the ATA or federal criminal 
statutes that prohibit the provision of material support and resources to terrorists, which form the 
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basis of plaintiffs’ claims.6 Facebook’s violation of §§ 2339A and 2339B does not depend upon 
the content that Hamas or its operatives post, nor do plaintiffs’ claims depend on characterizing 
Facebook as the publisher or speaker of Hamas’s content. 
In support of its claim of CDA immunity, Facebook cites numerous cases in footnote 2 
and page 10 of its brief addressing various forms of objectionable “content” posted by third-
parties on websites. However, none of these cases applies to the facts of this case in which it is 
provision of services, not “objectionable content,” that forms the basis of plaintiffs’ claims. 
Facebook wants to characterize this case about “content” rather than material support and 
resources, so that it can continue the practice it has engaged in for more than half a decade: 
substituting its own self-defined “Community Standards,” which Facebook claims to use to 
decide whether to censor a particular post if another user happens to report the post as 
“offensive,” for the absolute federal criminal prohibitions on providing its services to terrorists 
under §§ 2339A and 2339B and Executive Orders 12947 and 13224. This practice is coupled 
with Facebook’s refusal to use available resources and technology to identify and shut down 
Hamas and other terrorist accounts in order to feign ignorance as to their existence, in the face of 
repeated reports and criticism that it is allowing these groups to openly operate on Facebook. 
Facebook cannot hide behind the CDA to evade responsibility for its conduct. 
Thus, in its motion, Facebook claims: “Facebook has zero tolerance for terrorism. It 
condemns terrorist actions, prohibits terrorist content on Facebook, and swiftly removes any 
reported terrorist content.” (MTD at 1) (emphasis added). First, such self-serving claims by 
                                                 
6 See CDA, 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1): “Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair the 
enforcement of . . . any . . . Federal criminal statute.” It must also be noted that the ATA was 
enacted later and amended (most recently via JASTA a few months ago), and thus post-dates by 
far the enactment of the CDA. Even if there were a conflict between the limited immunity 
granted by the CDA and the liability imposed by the ATA, the ATA would control as its later 
enactment would be a tacit limiting of the CDA. 
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Facebook are not drawn from allegations in the Force-FAC, and are not properly introduced by 
Facebook in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. More significant, however, is Facebook’s tacit 
acknowledgement that in practice, it ignores terrorists’ use of its services unless it receives a 
complaint, and even then Facebook’s focus is on whether or not to remove “terrorist content,” 
not to completely shut down terrorists’ accounts and cease providing services to the terrorists. 
In upholding 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, the U.S. Supreme Court specifically credited State 
Department testimony that: “‘[t]he experience and analysis of the U.S. government agencies 
charged with combating terrorism strongly suppor[t]’ Congress’s finding that all contributions to 
foreign terrorist organizations further their terrorism.” Holder, 561 U.S. at 33 (quoting McKune 
affidavit) (emphasis added).7 The Court rejected a claim that prohibiting the provision of non-
violent services to a foreign terrorist organization violated the provider’s First Amendment right 
to “free speech,” and explained the necessity of the prohibition as follows:  
The material-support statute is, on its face, a preventive measure—it criminalizes 
not terrorist attacks themselves, but aid that makes the attacks more likely to 
occur. . . .  
[P]laintiffs simply disagree with the considered judgment of Congress and the 
Executive that providing material support to a designated foreign terrorist 
organization—even seemingly benign support—bolsters the terrorist activities of 
that organization. That judgment, however, is entitled to significant weight, and 
we have persuasive evidence before us to sustain it. Given the sensitive interests 
in national security and foreign affairs at stake, the political branches have 
adequately substantiated their determination that, to serve the Government’s 
interest in preventing terrorism, it was necessary to prohibit providing material 
support in the form of training, expert advice, personnel, and services to foreign 
terrorist groups, even if the supporters meant to promote only the groups’ 
nonviolent ends. 
                                                 
7 The affidavit added: “Given the purposes, organizational structure, and clandestine 
nature of foreign terrorist organizations, it is highly likely that any material support to these 
organizations will ultimately inure to the benefit of their criminal, terrorist functions—
regardless of whether such support was ostensibly intended to support non-violent, non-
terrorist activities.” Id. (emphasis added). 
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Holder, 561 U.S. at 36 (emphasis added). 
The only federal case to date to address the issue of the CDA in the context of an ATA 
claim is a lone district court decision in Fields v. Twitter, 2016 WL 4205687 (N.D. Cal. 2016). 
The district court in Fields determined that a claim that Twitter permitted ISIS to use Twitter “as 
a tool for spreading extremist propaganda, raising funds, and attracting new recruits,” was barred 
by the CDA because it sought to “treat Twitter as a publisher.” Id. at *6. The Fields court added 
that, if the plaintiffs had challenged the provision of accounts more directly “it would be just as 
barred” by the CDA as “publishing activity” because it involves Twitter exercising its discretion 
about “what third-party content may be posted online.” Id. 
Fields was plainly wrongly decided and an outlier, and in any case is factually 
distinguishable from Force. First, neither Twitter nor Facebook has discretion about whether or 
not to provide resources and services to ISIS or Hamas. These entities are designated FTO’s, and 
it is a federal crime for Twitter or Facebook to provide services to these groups, regardless of 
content. Moreover, the immunity that flows from the CDA is only immunity from being treated 
as the “speaker or publisher” of another party’s content. Liability under §§ 2339A and 2339B 
and the ATA is about providing services to designated FTO’s and thereby engaging in 
international terrorism, not whether content is attributed to Twitter or Facebook. 
Fields is also factually distinct from Force because Fields involved a “lone wolf” 
attacker and no allegations of how ISIS’s use of Twitter was connected to the attack at issue. In 
contrast, the Force plaintiffs were injured by Hamas operatives, and plaintiffs have alleged how 
Facebook’s provision of services and resources to Hamas substantially contributed to Hamas’s 
ability to carry out the attacks at issue and the attacks were a foreseeable consequence of the 
support provided by Facebook. Thus, the CDA does not bar plaintiffs’ ATA claims. 
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D. The CDA Does Not Have Extraterritorial Application 
Facebook’s reliance upon CDA immunity fails for another reason: Facebook provides 
aid, support, and resources to HAMAS and other terrorists in and around Israel, plaintiffs in both 
Force and Cohen suffered injury in Israel, and the Force-FAC and Cohen-FAC assert claims 
against Facebook under Israeli law. The CDA, however, does not apply outside the territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States. Accordingly, insofar as Facebook relies upon the CDA for 
immunity for actions and claims that arose abroad, Facebook’s claim of immunity must fail. 
In 2010 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the “longstanding principle of American law ‘that 
legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.’” Morrison v. Australia National Bank, 130 S. Ct. at 
2877 (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248, (1991) (Aramco) (quoting 
Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)). The Court said this principle is “a canon 
of construction, or a presumption about a statute’s meaning,” which “rests on the perception that 
Congress ordinarily legislates with respect to domestic, not foreign matters.” Id. (citing Blackmer 
v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932); Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204, n. 5 
(1993)).8 Accordingly, the Court in Morrison held that, “‘unless there is the affirmative intention 
of the Congress clearly expressed’ to give a statute extraterritorial effect, ‘we must presume it is 
primarily concerned with domestic conditions.’” Id. (quoting Aramco at 248). Moreover, the 
presumption against extraterritorial effect “applies regardless of whether there is a risk of 
conflict between the American statute and a foreign law.” Id. at 2878 (citing Sale v. Haitian 
Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 173-174 (1993)). Put simply, “[w]hen a statute gives no 
clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.” Id. at 2878. 
                                                 
8 See also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (quoting 
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007)) (explaining that this canon “reflects the 
‘presumption that United States law governs domestically but does not rule the world’”). 
Case 1:16-cv-04453-NGG-LB   Document 29   Filed 01/13/17   Page 38 of 49 PageID #: 1003
-31-  
Since the CDA “gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application,” under 
Morrison, the CDA has no extraterritorial application. In fact, the text of the CDA reinforces the 
presumption that Congress only intended the statute to apply domestically. For example, 
Congress’s findings recited in section (a) of the CDA refer to the Internet and other interactive 
computer services that are “available to individual Americans,” that have flourished “to the 
benefit of all Americans,” and upon which “Americans” increasingly rely. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(1), 
(4), (5). The CDA also describes as part of the “policy of the United States” the preservation of a 
“vibrant and competitive free market” in these services “unfettered by Federal or State 
regulation.” Id. at § 230(b)(2).9 Likewise, in prescribing the CDA’s “[e]ffect on other laws,” 
§ 230(e) refers only to federal, State, and local laws; there is no mention of foreign law. 
The CDA thus does not have extraterritorial application, and does not provide immunity 
to Facebook for its activities abroad, particularly as to plaintiffs’ claims under Israeli law. 
1. Plaintiffs’ Israeli Tort Claims 
Both Force and Cohen include claims under Israeli law for: 1) negligence under Israel’s 
Civil Wrongs Ordinance (New Version)—1972 (“CWO”) §§ 35-36; 2) breach of statutory duty 
under CWO § 63; and 3) vicarious liability under CWO §§ 12 and 15. 
The elements of Israeli tort law are: 1) duty; 2) breach; 3) causation; and 4) damages. See 
Wultz v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 57-81 (2010) (providing a detailed discussion of 
Israeli tort law). As to negligence, Israel’s CWO § 35 provides (in translation): 
When a person does some act which in the circumstances a reasonable prudent 
person would not do, or fails to do some act which in the circumstances such a 
person would do, . . . then such act or failure constitutes carelessness and a 
person’s carelessness as aforesaid in relation to another person to whom he owes 
a duty in the circumstances not to act as he did constitutes negligence. Any person 
                                                 
9 But see CDA, 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1): “Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair 
the enforcement of . . . any . . . Federal criminal statute.” 
Case 1:16-cv-04453-NGG-LB   Document 29   Filed 01/13/17   Page 39 of 49 PageID #: 1004
-32-  
who causes damage to any person by his negligence commits a civil wrong. 
Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 57-58. CWO § 36 clarifies that the words “another person” in the 
second to last sentence of § 35 apply to all persons to whom injury was foreseeable. Id. Thus, 
under Israeli law, every actor has a duty wherever “a reasonable person ought in the 
circumstances to have contemplated as likely” that his act or omission will affect another. Id. 
Israeli law incorporates two types of duties: a subjective “concrete duty,” which applies 
wherever an actor, in light of the facts and circumstances, could have foreseen that his act or 
omission would yield a harm; and an objective “notional duty,” which applies wherever, as a 
matter of Israeli policy, the actor ought to have foreseen the harm (without regard to the 
particular facts). Id. at 58-59. 
“Breach of statutory duty” under Israeli law (CWO § 63) is a civil private right of action 
“for the violation [of] any enactment of the Knesset [Israel’s Parliament], including penal 
enactments, so long as certain elements are met.” Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 67. The relevant 
portion of the statute reads (in translation): 
Breach of a statutory duty consists of the failure by any person to perform a duty 
imposed upon him by any enactment other than this Ordinance, being an 
enactment which, . . . as intended to be for the benefit or protection of any other 
person, whereby such other person suffers damage of a kind or nature 
contemplated by such enactment . . . 
Id.10 
Although termed “vicarious liability,” Israel’s CWO § 12 is not the same as the American 
concept of vicarious liability; rather it is a separate cause of action against a person who 
                                                 
10 The enactments upon which plaintiffs’ breach of statutory duty rely are: Israel’s 
Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, 5708-1948, §§ 1, 4 (praise, support, or calls for support of 
terrorism prohibited); Israel’s Penal Law, 5737-1977, §§ 134, 136, 144-45, and 148 (banning 
incitement to violence and terror, material support for terrorism); and Israel’s Defense 
Regulations (Emergency Period), 1945, §§ 84-85 (provision of any service for any unlawful 
organization, including groups engaged in terrorist activities, prohibited). 
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participates in, assists, advises, or solicits an act or omission committed or about to be committed 
by another person, or who orders, authorizes, or ratifies such an act or omission. Id. at 80-81. 
CWO § 15 also recognizes action against a person for the acts or omissions of a party with whom 
he contracts if, among other things, he was negligent in selecting the contractor, authorized or 
ratified the acts of the contractor, or if the contract was entered into for an unlawful purpose. 
2. Applicability of Israeli Tort Law 
New York conflict law begins with determining whether the laws at issue actually 
conflict. Matter of Allstate Ins. Co., 81 N.Y.2d 219, 223 (1993). The question is whether there is 
an “actual conflict” of law as applied to the specific facts of this case (regardless of whether that 
conflict would yield a different result as to liability). Finance One Pub. Co. v. Lehman Bros. 
Special Fin., 414 F.3d 325, 331 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Tronlone v. Lac d’Amiante du Quebec, 
Ltee, 297 A.D.2d 528, 747 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1st Dep’t 2002)). Differences in substantive law 
conflict where there exists “a ‘significant possible effect on the outcome of the trial.’” Finance 
One, 414 F.3d at 331 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Thus a conflict exists when the 
jurisdictions involved provide different substantive rules and those differences are “‘relevant’ to 
the issue at hand.” Id. 
Here, while the primary elements of negligence (breach, duty, causation, damage) are the 
same under New York and Israeli law, courts have found that a conflict of law analysis is 
warranted because there are substantive differences in Israeli negligence law, particularly 
regarding duty and foreseeability, which would have a significant possible effect on the outcome 
of litigation. See Wultz v. Bank of China, Ltd., 811 F. Supp. 2d 841, 850 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). The 
court in Elmaliach v. Bank of China, Ltd. explained some of these differences: 
As discussed most fully in Wultz I, the Israeli law of negligence “differs slightly” 
from New York law in that duty is divided into fact and notional duty and 
depends on foreseeability (755 F. Supp. 2d at 58). Under Israel’s CWO, the 
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analysis of whether a duty is owed involves an inquiry into whether a reasonable 
person could have foreseen the occurrence of the damage under the particular 
circumstances alleged; whether as a matter of policy, a reasonable person ought to 
have foreseen the occurrence of the particular damage; and whether the 
occurrence causing the damage was foreseeable (id. at 58-59). This differs from 
New York law, where the foreseeability of harm does not define duty and, absent 
a duty running directly to the injured person, there is no liability in damages, 
however careless the conduct or foreseeable the harm (see 532 Madison Ave. 
Gourmet Foods v Finlandia Ctr., 96 NY2d 280, 289 [2001]). 
Elmaliach v. Bank of China, Ltd., 110 A.D.3d 192, 201 (1st Dep’t 2013). Moreover, the “breach 
of statutory duty” and “vicarious liability” provisions contained in Israel’s CWO are unique 
foreign substantive laws that have no equivalent under New York law. Id; see also Wultz v. Bank 
of China, Ltd., 811 F. Supp. 2d at 850. Thus, conflict of law analysis is appropriate in this case. 
Upon establishing a conflict in tort law, New York courts employ an “interest analysis” 
to determine which of competing jurisdictions has the greatest interest in having its law applied 
in the lawsuit. Padula v. Lilarn Props. Corp., 84 N.Y.2d 519, 521 (1994); Schultz v. Boy Scouts 
of Am., Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 189, 197 (1985). The interest analysis involves two questions: “(1) what 
are the significant contacts and in which jurisdiction are they located; and (2) whether the 
purpose of the law [at issue] is to regulate conduct or allocate loss.” Padula, 84 N.Y.2d at 521.  
As to the second question, the Israeli laws upon which Plaintiffs base their Israeli causes 
of action all have the regulation of conduct as their primary purpose. A statute that “in effect 
dictates the standard of care required” for a claim “falls within the category of conduct regulating 
rather than loss-allocating.” Devore v. Pfizer Inc., 58 A.D.3d 138, 141 (1st Dep’t 2008). A claim 
for negligence is clearly a conduct-regulating law. HSA Residential Mortg. Servs. of Texas v. 
Casuccio, 350 F. Supp. 2d 352, 364 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). Israel’s unique “breach of statutory duty” 
claim and the underlying enactments at issue in this case are also conduct-regulating, as they are 
designed to uphold statutorily imposed duties to prevent terrorism, violence, and incitement, and 
to make it more difficult for terrorists to operate. Similarly, Israel’s unique “vicarious liability” 
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claim is conduct-regulating because, unlike an American employer liability claim, the Israeli law 
is not designed to allocate loss, but among other things to deter a person from participating in, 
assisting, advising or soliciting another party’s act or omission. 
Where a conduct-regulating tort has been committed, “the law of the jurisdiction where 
the tort occurred will generally apply because that jurisdiction has the greatest interest in 
regulating behavior within its borders.” Cooney v. Osgood Mach., Inc., 81 N.Y.2d 66, 72 (1993). 
Generally, the “place of the tort” is defined by “the place where the last event necessary to make 
the actor liable occurred.” Schultz, 65 N.Y.2d at 195. Thus, “[w]here the defendant’s negligent 
conduct occurs in one jurisdiction and the plaintiff suffers injuries in another, ‘the place of the 
wrong is considered to be the place where the last event necessary to make the actor liable 
occurred,’ that is, ‘where the plaintiffs’ injuries occurred.’” Elmaliach, 110 A.D.3d at 203 
(quoting Schultz, 65 N.Y.2d at 195; and citing Devore v Pfizer, 58 A.D.3d at 141). In this case, 
that place is Israel. While Facebook’s relevant actions were in multiple locations, including 
Israel, New York, and Ireland (and possibly California), Facebook’s liability attached as a result 
of events in Israel, where Hamas attacks occurred and 20,000 Israeli plaintiffs remain exposed to 
enhanced risk from Hamas due to Facebook’s actions.11 The injury to plaintiffs caused by 
Facebook’s actions—“the last event necessary”—undoubtedly occurred and continues to occur 
in Israel. Therefore, as Israel is the place of injury, Israel’s law should be applied in these cases. 
There is no reason to deviate from this well-established place of injury rule here. While 
                                                 
11 See e.g., Greenberg, Trager & Herbst, LLP v. HSBC Bank USA, 17 N.Y.3d 565, 576 (2011) 
(“To establish a cause of action sounding in negligence, a plaintiff must establish the existence 
of a duty on defendant’s part to plaintiff, breach of the duty and damages.”) (Emphasis added) 
(Citation omitted); see also Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 31 A.D.2d 392, 395 (1st Dep’t 1969) (“The 
injury . . . is the humiliation and outrage to plaintiff’s feelings, resulting from the telecast. The 
last event necessary to make the defendant liable was not the final act in publication of the 
telecast . . . but the reaction of the telecast on [plaintiff’s] sensibilities.”) (Internal citation and 
quotation marks omitted). 
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Israel, New York, and California each have an interest in regulating Facebook’s conduct, Israel’s 
interests in having its laws apply in these cases far outweigh those of New York or California. 
These cases concern Facebook providing services to terrorists located in Israel, Gaza, and the 
West Bank. These terrorists use Facebook to facilitate their terrorist activity, and they 
specifically target and carry out their attacks in Israel. Israel is the domicile of the 20,000 Israeli 
plaintiffs in Cohen. It is the place where plaintiffs are suffering injury and the greatest impact of 
the attacks is felt. Israel “has a strong interest in seeing that its aggrieved citizens obtain redress 
for wrongs committed upon them.” See K.T. v. Dash, 37 A.D.3d 107, 114 (1st Dep’t 2006); 
Oveissi v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 573 F.3d 835, 842-43 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (implying that when the 
domiciliaries of a particular locale are targeted, that locale has the greatest interest in having its 
laws apply). Moreover, by specifically legislating that its anti-terror statutes (upon which 
plaintiffs’ “breach of statutory duty” claim is based) apply extraterritorially, Israel has 
demonstrated its strong interest in having its laws apply in cases such as this. See Wultz, 755 F. 
Supp. 2d at 68-70. 
Because the laws at issue are “conduct-regulating” and the “interest analysis” clearly 
demonstrates that Israel has the greatest interest in having its laws apply in this case, Plaintiffs’ 
claims under Israeli law are properly before this Court. 
PART II 
COHEN V. FACEBOOK: THE INJUNCTION LAWSUIT 
A. Facebook Is Subject to Personal Jurisdiction in New York  
Facebook claims it is not subject to general jurisdiction in this Court because New York 
is not its place of incorporation or principal place of business. (MTD at 27-30) (citing, Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011) and Daimler AG v. Bauman, 
134 S. Ct. 746 (2014)). However, Daimler recognized that a corporation could be subject to 
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personal jurisdiction where its “affiliations with the State are so continuous and systematic as to 
render [it] essentially at home in the forum state.” Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 (citations and 
internal quotations omitted). Moreover, under CPLR § 301, “a defendant may be subject to 
general jurisdiction [in New York] by virtue of its physical presence, domicile, consent, or 
‘doing business’ in New York.” Beach v. Citigroup Alternative Investments LLC, 2014 WL 
904650, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
1. Facebook Consented to Jurisdiction Via New York’s Registration Statute 
Facebook consented to general personal jurisdiction in New York when it registered to do 
business in New York pursuant to N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1301. As a condition for being 
authorized to do business in New York, Facebook had to designate the New York secretary of 
state as its agent for service of process. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 304(a) and (b). Historically, New 
York courts have interpreted these provisions as consent to general personal jurisdiction.12 Even 
after Goodyear and Daimler, New York courts have held that registration in New York as a 
foreign corporation constitutes consent to personal jurisdiction for purposes of CPLR § 301.13  
                                                 
12 See CPLR § 301, Alexander, Supplementary Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons. 
Laws of N.Y. CPLR C301:6 (2015); see also, e.g., Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 
165, 170, 175 (1939); Bagdon v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 217 N.Y. 432, 436-38 (1916) 
(consent to jurisdiction based on New York registration statute “is a real consent”); Rockefeller 
Univ. v. Ligand Pharms., 581 F. Supp. 2d 461, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (defendant’s “unrevoked 
authorization to do business and its designation of a registered agent for service of process 
amount to consent to personal jurisdiction in New York”). 
13 See, e.g., Zucker v. Waldman, 46 Misc. 3d 1214(A), 9 N.Y.S.3d 596 (N.Y. Sup. 2015) 
(foreign corporation could have been subjected to personal jurisdiction in New York by consent 
had it registered to do business in New York); Bailen v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp., 2014 WL 
3885949, at *4-5, 2014 NY Slip Op 32079(U) (N.Y. Sup. Co. 2014) (“although Daimler clearly 
narrows the reach of New York courts in terms of its exercise of general jurisdiction over 
foreign entities, it does not change the law with respect to personal jurisdiction based on 
consent”); Beach, 2014 WL 904650, at *7 (“[n]otwithstanding these limitations [in Goodyear and 
Daimler], a corporation may consent to jurisdiction in New York under CPLR § 301 by 
registering as a foreign corporation and designating a local agent”); see also B & M Kingstone, 
LLC v. Mega Int’l Commercial Bank Co., 131 A.D.3d 259, 264-65, 15 N.Y.S.3d 318 (N.Y. App. Div.), 
(continued next page) 
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Moreover, an amendment to N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1301 currently pending in the New 
York State Senate, would codify this case law:  
(E) A foreign corporation’s application for authority to do business in this state, 
whenever filed, constitutes consent to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for 
all actions against such corporation. A surrender of such application shall 
constitute a withdrawal of consent to jurisdiction. 
New York State Senate Bill S4846 (https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2015/S4846). 
2. Facebook Is Subject to Personal Jurisdiction in New York Under CPLR 
§ 301 Because it Does Business in New York 
Facebook’s New York presence is also so substantial that it satisfies the “doing business” 
prong of CPLR § 301. Facebook maintains more than 561,000 square feet of office space in New 
York and employs more than 1,300 employees in its New York office, which comprise nearly 
5% of its employees worldwide. (MTD, So Decl. ¶5, Farren Decl. ¶ 6). These employees work in 
Global Marketing Solutions, Technology, and Business Development. Id. Among other things, 
they release daily updates and improvements to Facebook’s social media platform and services 
worldwide. (Cohen-FAC ¶ 11). Facebook also maintains New York bank accounts holding more 
than $700 million in cash, cash equivalents, and marketable securities. Id. 
It has long been the law in New York that “[a] foreign corporation is amenable to suit in 
New York courts under CPLR § 301 if it has engaged in such a continuous and systematic course 
of ‘doing business’ there that a finding of its ‘presence’ in this jurisdiction is warranted.” Mejia-
                                                                                                                                                             
leave to appeal dismissed, 26 N.Y.3d 995, 41 N.E.3d 74 (2015) (foreign bank consented to 
jurisdiction by registering with state department of financial services). 
Although the Second Circuit rejected consent jurisdiction under Connecticut’s 
registration statute in Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619 (2d Cir. 2016), the decision 
was limited to Connecticut’s statute, which the court held was “ambiguous,” unlike New York’s 
statute and caselaw. The court distinguished New York’s statute, stating: “[t]he registration 
statute in the state of New York has been definitively construed to accomplish [consent to 
general jurisdiction], and legislation has been introduced to ratify that construction of the 
statute.” Id. The court agreed that jurisdiction may be constitutional under other statutes. Id. 
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Haffner v. Killington, Ltd., 119 A.D.3d 912, 990 N.Y.S.2d 561 (2014) (collecting cases).14 
Certainly, Facebook is “present” in New York under the traditional doing business standard.  
3. Facebook is “At Home” in New York 
Facebook is “at home” in New York even under Goodyear and Daimler. The Supreme 
Court left open the possibility for personal jurisdiction over a corporation in a location other than 
its place of incorporation or principal place of business. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761, n. 19 
(corporation’s in-forum operations can be so substantial as to render it at home in the forum). 
Goodyear and Daimler involved foreign defendant corporations being sued on the basis of 
contacts of their in-state subsidiaries or affiliates. In contrast, Facebook is registered to do 
business in New York, maintains a substantial presence here and conducts extensive business 
activities here. The other cases cited and relied upon by Facebook all involve situations where 
the foreign corporation had no—or extremely limited—presence in the forum state.15 
4. Facebook is Subject to Specific Jurisdiction Under CPLR § 302 
Specific jurisdiction is appropriate because the causes of action arise out of Facebook’s 
“transact[ion] of any business within the state” or “tortious act within the state CPLR § 302 (a). 
Facebook has a New York engineering hub where employees release updates and improvements 
                                                 
14 See also Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int’l, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 537 (1967); Mejia-Haffner, 990 
N.Y.S.2d at 561; S. Seas Holding Corp. v. Starvest Grp., Inc., 46 Misc. 3d 1226(A), 13 N.Y.S.3d 853 
(2d Dep’t 2015) (discussing New York’s pre-Daimler doing business standard as good law). 
15 In Sonera Holdings, defendant Turkish company had no physical presence in New York 
and was not registered to do business there. Sonera Holdings B.V. v. Cukorova Holding A.S., 750 
F.3d 221, 225 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2888 (2014) (“Daimler and Goodyear d[o] not hold 
that a corporation may be subject to general jurisdiction only in a forum where it is 
incorporated or has its principal place of business”) (citations and internal quotations omitted); 
Cont’l Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Equate Petrochemical Co., 586 F. App’x 768, 769-70 (2d Cir. 2014) (no 
allegation that defendant was “at home” in New York); Gucci, 768 F.3d at 135 (Bank of China’s 
New York branch relatively insignificant for its overall business); Del Castillo v. PMI Holdings N. 
Am. Inc., 2015 WL 3833447, at *3 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (general jurisdiction proper over out-of-state 
defendant with Texas office and local registered agent). 
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every day to its users worldwide. Facebook’s New York engineers are thus directly responsible 
for developing, improving, and providing certain Facebook services that terrorists use to further 
their activities, including Facebook’s mobile platform, messaging, and payment services. 
B. The Cohen Plaintiffs Have Standing to Sue Facebook 
The three basic elements of standing are: (1) injury-in-fact to plaintiff; (2) causation by 
defendant; and (3) redressability. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).  
To meet the first element, a plaintiff must allege an “injury-in-fact,” meaning an 
“invasion of legally protected interest” that is both “concrete and particularized” and “actual or 
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Id. at 560. Where plaintiff seeks declaratory or 
injunctive relief, he “must show he is suffering an ongoing injury or faces an immediate threat of 
injury.” Dearth v. Holder, 641 F.3d 499, 501 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The requirement to show that the 
injury is “fairly traceable” to the defendant’s actions is “lower than proximate cause.” Rothstein, 
708 F.3d at 92. Finally, the redressability element does not require plaintiff to show that the 
relief will solve or eliminate the injury entirely. Mass. v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1458 (2007). 
The Cohen plaintiffs, 20,000 Israeli citizens who live in Israel, have alleged that the 
Israeli statutes at issue were passed to protect the plaintiffs and impose a duty upon Facebook to 
refrain from providing aid support and resources to terrorist groups. Plaintiffs have shown that 
Facebook breached this duty, and they suffer ongoing intimidation and coercion as part of the 
civilian population targeted by such terrorism. Finally, an order by the Court requiring Facebook 
to comply with its legal duty and take active steps to cease providing services and resources to 
terrorists will be a major step in depriving terrorists of resources and would likely affect the 
scope, intensity, and frequency of such attacks, thus reducing the ongoing injury to plaintiffs. 
Thus, Facebooks’ challenge to the Cohen plaintiffs’ standing to bring this action is without merit. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, the defendants’ motion should be denied in all respects. 
Dated: Brooklyn, New York 
 December 20, 2016 
      Yours,  
 
THE BERKMAN LAW OFFICE, LLC  
Attorneys for the plaintiffs 
by:       
 Robert J. Tolchin 
111 Livingston Street, Suite 1928 
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